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Investments in power generation in Great Britain c.1960-2010 - The role of accounting 
and the financialisation of investment decisions. 
Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper explores the increasing role of financialisation on investment decisions in the 
power generation industry in Great Britain (GB). Such decisions affect society, and the 
relative role of financialisation in these macro-levels decisions has not been explored from a 
historical perspective. 
Design and method 
The paper draws on historical material and interview data. Specifically, we use an approach 
inspired by institutional sociology drawing on elements of Scott’s (2014) pillars of 
institutions. Applying concepts stemming from regulative and normative pressures, we 
explore changes in investments over the analysis period to determine forces which 
institutionalised practices - such as accounting - into investment in power generation. 
 
Findings 
Investments in electricity generation have different levels of public and private participation. 
However, the common logics that underpin such investment practices provide an important 
understanding of the political-economics and institutional change in the UK. Thus, the 
heightened use of accounting in investment has been, to some extent, a contributory factor to 
the power supply problems now faced by the British public. 
Originality/value 
This paper contributes to prior literature on the effects of financialisation on society, adding 
power generation/energy supply to the many societal level issues already explored. It also 
provides brief but unique insights into the changing nature of the role of accounting in an 
industry sector over an extended timeframe. 
Key words: Investment, electricity generation, society, financialisation, institutional 
sociology   
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1. Introduction 
The financialisation of energy policy implies increased use of market mechanisms, with the 
financial sector and financial actors (such as accountants) playing a critical role in the 
decision making process of investments in power generation assets. However, with Great 
Britain (GB) currently witnessing an investment hiatus, should an essential commodity such 
as electricity, be subject to values and ideology of this phenomenon? In other words, should 
investments in power stations be financialised1? With the electricity industry struggling to 
secure investment, this paper challenges the paradigm of neo-liberal economic policy which 
is supported by financialisation for the energy sector. To be specific, this paper examines the 
increasing impact of accounting (with those using accounting as the financial actors with 
financial motive in the financialisation process) on such decisions. We do this by reflecting 
on historical developments in GBs generation market from circa 1960-20102.  
 
Electricity is essential to support business and households, and, thus, so is maintaining a 
secure production of electricity. In power generation, the importance of investment is 
unquestioned, as commissioning a power station is a multi-million pound investments - or 
billion-pound if nuclear is considered. For example, the proposed joint nuclear project with 
EDF and CGN at the Hinkley Point C plant is estimated at £24.5bn (EDF, 2015), highlighting 
the significance of financial capital. Investments of such magnitude draw on many fields of 
expertise, one of them being (management) accounting, where various investment analysis 
techniques (e.g. net present value (NPV), return on capital employed) are utilised. However, 
financing and accounting are not the only concern in power generation investments – location 
of plants, demand, supply, economic conditions, government policy and market participation 
also feature, to name a few - which are beyond our scope.   
 
In GB, the capacity of existing power stations determines the ratio between supply and 
demand, or the capacity margin. There is a present demand for new financing (Warren, 2014) 
to improve the capacity margin following an investment hiatus from 2006 to 2010, when the 
Big Six generators3 did almost no new significant investing. By examining the broader 
historical background to the present problem, and in particular the relative influence of 
                                                            
1 A similar question is posed in the water industry (Bayliss, 2015). 
2 For this paper, it is important to specify GB rather than the UK, as Northern Ireland operates under separate 
market conditions as part of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) for the island of Ireland. 
3 RWE Npower, EDF, E.ON, SSE, Iberdola and Centrica.  
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financial actors in the investments, we can potentially attain an understanding of why GB is 
lacking necessary investment. We can identify how institutional forces may have affected the 
influence that financial actors have in the investment decision process; for example, what 
caused them to change and/or remain stable, or to be more influential in investment 
decisions? To help identify these forces, we draw on the work of Scott (2014), who identified 
three pillars underpinning institutions and institutionalised practices – in particular normative 
and regulative pillars. We can then draw some tentative explanations on the role of financial 
actors (such as managers and accountants) and their methods in contributing to the present 
GB energy crisis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section, Section 2 provides, and 
details extant literature on financialisation, institutional sociology and then some historical 
and contextual background to the current energy crisis. Section 3 outlines our method, with 
Section 4 detailing the nature of investment practices in GB’s energy sector for the analysis 
period. Section 5 completes the paper with some discussion and concluding comments. 
 
2. Literature and context 
We now present a brief review of literature on financialisation and institutional sociology. 
This is followed by some context on the current energy crisis GB faces.   
 
2.1 Financialisation 
Studying the history of the political economy of the United Kingdom (UK) exposes 
institutional changes, and the political and social changes within. Every industry is influenced 
by political policies and/or macro incentives (Warren and Burns, forthcoming), which in the 
case of the electricity industry can have a significant impact on investment decisions. While 
money/finance has a pivotal role in the economy, this role as changed in the last 50 years. 
Finance was a means to measure or offer a value, providing a product or service with a way 
to exchange or be traded (Christopherson et al., 2013); however, there has been a shift 
towards ‘finance capitalism’, or the accumulation of profit within the financial system with 
institutional investors having more influence on the operations of organisations. 
 
One reason for the changing influence of finance is a “phenomenon” (Epstein, 2005:3) 
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known as financialisation. While a common definition seems elusive, various scholars have 
offered a version. For instance, Palley (2007:2), explains financialisation is “a process 
whereby financial markets, financial institutions and financial elites gain greater influence 
over economic policy and economic outcomes [...] transform[ing] the functioning of 
economic systems at both the macro and micro levels”. Epstein tries to encompass several 
definitions, noting “financialization is a process that depicts the increasing influence of 
financial motives, markets, actors and institutions on economies, both domestic and 
international” (2005:3). As such, actors within economies, businesses and organisations are 
subject to financialisation in that their decision-making may be based on expectations of 
other financial actors. When shareholder value gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, 
many (listed) businesses put an increase in shareholder value as their prime target. To achieve 
this, businesses prioritised strategies that create a positive shareholder value added (SVA); in 
doing so, accounting instruments such as NPV or the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) played a 
prominent role. Therefore, to understand the process of financialisation, Krippner (2005) asks 
who is in control of the organisation? 
 
At the same time, and as will be discussed later, a stronger focus on cost, efficiency and 
performance clearly indicated that accounting, and in particular management accounting, can 
provide a contribution to the process of financialisation. The relevance of accounting as a 
component of financialisation is also linked to accountants, who seek to legitimise the use of 
financial language and embed financial issues in support of decision-making (Legalais and 
Morales, 2014). As information providers and advisors, accountants provide a strong 
supporting role in the propagation of financialisation. Their interest is inherent, as their 
position in the information flow (Yagoubi, 2014), their expertise in accounting and finance, 
their importance as perceived by general management, as well as the advisory role between 
operational and general management are legitimised by linking local operations to 
financialisation (Legalais and Morales, 2014). To put it differently, a focus on decision-
relevant information provision, financial measures and outcomes reinforces the process of 
financialisation. This notion puts accounting and accountants as critical components of the 
financialisation process. 
 
The financialisation process links the accumulation of capital and the increasing power of 
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shareholders on business strategies (Froud et al. 2006) to investment strategies that follow 
financial motives. With Phillips’ (2006, cited in Christopherson et al., 2013) observation that 
the financial services have simply taken over every aspect of the national economy, 
Christopherson et al. (2013:351-352) agree and added that “finance has ceased simply to 
assist the running and operation of the real economy of goods and services, but rather has 
come to dominate, even displace, the latter.” This observed dominance of financialisation 
over investment decisions in the economy provides context to our examination of institutional 
changes that have influenced investment decision making at a macro-level. Thus, we can 
consider the impact that financialisation has had on energy policy and investments in this 
industry, and the role of accounting therein. 
  
The past decades have witnessed changes in capitalism and the dialogues surrounding this, 
regularly revolving around the issues of neo-liberalism, globalisation and financialisation. 
However, as McNicholas and Windsor (2011) argue, the latter has not been the subject of 
much attention. Despite the critical assessment given by studies of globalisation as a threat to 
the productive economy at national level (Van der Zwan, 2014), changes in the UK political 
environment comparatively fast-tracked financialisation (Davies, 2015). The UK Treasury 
pursued policies providing the financial sector with more control over the economy in general 
(Warren and Burns, forthcoming). With increased liberalisation and privatisation, the UK’s 
financialisation process was a national phenomenon in its own right (Epstein, 2005; Froud et 
al., 2006). Although most research on financialisation is targeted at the financial sector (e.g. 
Buchanon, 2016; Waldron, 2016), there is a growing interest in the impact on utilities; for 
example, March and Purcell (2014) investigate the global water industry. Pushing the 
boundaries of studies on financialisation is important because, as Van der Zwan (2014) 
argues, studies on the process of financialisation have identified how global finance has 
changed the logics that frame the economy. 
This paper develops an understanding of the changing logics behind investment decisions in 
GB, logics which have influenced economic policy. With the electricity industry requiring 
significant sums of financial capital to construct large scale power stations, access to capital 
has changed over time. Additionally, new financial instruments emerged, e.g. to control 
emissions, changing investment risk. In short, as Epstein (2005) argues, there are bigger 
stakes at play. The financial rent of such investments now not only supports the basic needs 
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supplied through electricity production, but provide pension funds through institutional 
investors, for example. It is not only the capital investments that have been subject to 
financialisation, the environmental impact of these assets have also been governed through 
market mechanisms, similar to the water sector (Bresnihan, 2016).  
 
2.2 Institutional Sociology 
As noted, we draw on institutional sociology (IS) as a theoretical lens. Before detailing some 
facets of IS, we should note that we are adopting a neo-institutionalist history approach - see 
Rowlinson and Hassard (2013) - by drawing on neo-institutionalist concepts to illuminate 
telling of historic events. We are not setting out to advance neo-institutionalist theory per se - 
a notion that Rowlinson and Hassard (2013) refer to as historical neo-institutionalism. As will  
be detailed later,  we  only draw on elements of Scott’s work; namely pressures stemming 
from regulatory and normative pillars that help to reveal the common logics that underpin 
investment practices.  
 
IS has been utilised previously by accounting scholars – e.g. Akbar et al. (2015), Collier 
(2001); Modell (2003); Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007); Seal (2006); Tsamenyi et al. (2006). 
We utilise it to examine how the role of accounting in investment decisions has changed over 
time, ultimately contributing to financialisation processes and GB’s potential energy crisis. 
Tsamenyi et al. (2006), who studied the electricity industry, argue that IS is particularly 
relevant to studies focusing on uncertainties, - and is useful for understanding organisations 
competing for political and institutional legitimacy and/or market position - which is 
applicable to the GB power generation industry.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
We draw on elements of Scott’s (2014) three pillars of institutions (Figure 1) to determine 
institutional factors driving investments. We focus on how investment practices changed over 
time, at both organisational and a broader industry-level. The term ‘organisational field’ is 
used to describe similar social groupings, and has been described as “set(s) of organisations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 
148). This makes the collective, not the individual, the unit of analysis. In this study, the GB 
7 
electricity generation industry is the organisational field. Collective beliefs emerge through 
interaction within organisations, and in the short term, this behaviour creates social norms 
within the boundaries of those beliefs (Greenwood et al., 2002). Scott’s (2014) pillars of 
institutions can be applied to organisational fields. Specifically, we draw on the normative 
and regulative pillars to frame to broader developments in the electricity industry. The 
regulative pillar is often emphasised because of the high value it places on rule setting and 
sanctioning power. For regulators, governments and the legal system, the regulative pillar is a 
source of power; however, if regulation is weak, it may be subject to challenge from 
organisations. The second pillar, normative, refers to norms and values, such as legitimate 
profit-seeking behaviour or professional norms. We do not utilise the third pillar of Scott’s 
(2014) model, the cultural-cognitive pillar, as it focuses on common meanings and 
conceptions within a cultural setting, shared by the actors within an organisational field. Such 
shared conceptions are the result of intrinsic interpretations (the cognitive) of extrinsic stimuli 
(the cultural). Individual decision-makers interpret and mediate between external symbols 
and meanings attributed to observed objects and activities; they do this within the respective 
cultural context they are set within. Making “sense” of what occurs in the organisational field 
shapes the interpretation of the how and why. The desire to conform to behavioural patterns 
observed – a “mimetic” mechanism (see below) – is subjective to the decision-maker, and 
reflects back to the cultural context in terms of symbols and taken-for-granted beliefs.  
 
Using the pillars of institutions, studies have shown that the intervention of powerful bodies 
or forces can cause organisational fields to become isomorphic, resulting in similar practices 
within organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism refers “to the adaptation of 
an institutional practice by an organisation” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) suggested three processes of isomorphic change drive the homogenisation of 
organisational fields; coercive, normative, and mimetic. Coercive isomorphism occurs in 
response to informal or formal external pressures, for example, cultural or political pressures, 
and regulative forces (the regulative pillar) (ibid). Normative isomorphism (the normative 
pillar) stems from normative pressures (ibid). Professionalisation is a common normative 
pressure, as managers in similar positions share similar training schemes/educational 
background, creating a drive toward parallel career needs and goal-setting behaviours. 
Finally, mimetic isomorphism transcends uncertainty within organisations by imitating 
solutions devised by other organisations (typically within the organisational field) in response 
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to similar problems. Some studies adopting IS have concentrated on isomorphism in 
organisations, as deviations can cause discomfort (for example see Greenwood et al., 2002). 
However, some studies discredit the influence of competing markets and possibly over-focus 
on the impact of institutions. For example, research by Hoque and Hopper (1997) found 
conflicts between institutional pressures and market forces, especially under turbulent 
conditions. Tsamenyi et al. (2006) perceived this concept to be useful when analysing the 
Spanish electricity industry, observing the institutional pressure from the government and 
market forces on the industry.  
 
However, as we detail in the methods section later, we did not explore the cultural settings of 
our 50-year timeframe and the corresponding cognitive patterns that may have arisen within 
them. This is due to the relatively dominant influence of regulative and normative influences 
on the electricity industry in the UK, and the difficulty to recreate the intrinsic mind-set of 
decision-makers over 50 years. The usefulness of the regulative and normative pillars to our 
analysis becomes evident when considering the dominant impact of legislation (regulative 
pillar), professional standards in engineering, accounting, and pressures from shareholders. 
 
As noted earlier, accounting and accountants may have a role to play in the financialisation 
process, as do other factors such as government policy and capital markets. These largely 
external factors also have/have had a role in how investment decisions are/were made in 
GB’s electricity overtime. Other scholars, including Dixon and Sorsa (2009), have examined 
financialisation from an institutional perspective and have emphasised the value of examining 
this phenomenon from an institutional change lens. Thus, our drawing on regulative and 
normative elements of Scott’s (2014) work, and the exclusion of cultural-cognitive 
interpretations of contemporary actors, enables us to trace forces for change in investment 
decisions over time at the organisational field level. 
 
2.3 The current energy crisis 
To understand the current investment hiatus, the present-day problems faced by GB’s 
electricity industry are now briefly outlined. The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) was 
implemented in 2014, as a response to a failing market and a lack of investment. GB 
experienced its first shortage call in November 2015, which is a concern that supply would 
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not meet demand. To try and overcome the investment hiatus, the EMR has introduced 
supply-side mechanisms to encourage investment, such as Contracts for Difference (CfD) and 
the Capacity Market. Demand-side issues were to be addressed through the Electricity 
Demand Reduction (EDR) programme. One media source reported in 2014: 
 
Britain’s supply of electricity is dangerously close to resurgent demand. The safety 
margin of capacity has been shrinking and now stands well below the 20 per cent 
necessary to insure against shocks. When demand rises in winter there is a high risk 
that the margin will disappear altogether. (FT, 2014) 
 
The Financial Times (2014) suggested further that the security of supply crisis was not a 
revelation to UK politicians - it had been long known that one fifth of capacity would exit the 
market within the next ten years.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
As shown in Figure 2, OFGEM’s forecasts indicated a blackouts risk in the event of high 
demand between 2015 and 2017, as the de-rated margin4 will be close to 0%. In 2015/16 the 
data shows only a 4% margin on the base case, below regulators’ advised margins. In the 
past, margins were typically averaged 20% to 25% (see Figure 3). The modelling in Figure 2 
is based on analysis of the de-rated margin against the base case (or normal) demand for 
electricity. Since 2012, when the modelling per Figure 2 was completed by OFGEM, further 
concerns have been raised. A Scottish Southern Electric (SSE) spokesperson commented: 
"We are heading for a critical period. We worry that [the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change] and National Grid have been over-optimistic," said Keith MacLean, 
director of policy and research at SSE at the Stationers' Company Autumn Forum in 
London. "We think that could easily flip to minus 5%." (Gosden, 2013) 
 
In support of SSE’s statement, the National Grid (BBC, 2014) created an emergency plan for 
the winter of 2014/15, to offer support capacity in the event of unexpected shutdowns.   
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Despite the media focus on potential blackouts, some note that GB has seen power cuts in the 
                                                            
4 The de-rated margin refers to data not based on design capacity or generator rate capacity, but data including 
sensitivities such as loss of load due to age and performance, the possibility of new power stations being 
commissioned on time, and the use of interconnectors. 
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past, and therefore we could ask what is new?” In past decades, blackouts were not related to 
a lack of investment, rather network failures5, shortage of fuel or industrial disputes6. As 
noted above, the present threat to capacity is the planned exit of one fifth of current capacity 
from the market by 2020 (Davey, 2012) (see Figures 2 and 4) and the reluctance to make new 
financial investments. This raises an interesting question, namely how and why is significant 
capacity leaving the system without new investment to replace decommissioned capacity? 
This of course relates to our research objective. 
Figure 4 indicates the potential crisis, showing that more capacity is leaving the market than 
entering. It shows the same de-rated base load line as Figure 2, but simultaneously compares 
new capacity entering and decommissioned capacity exiting the system. For example, in 
2015/16, approximately 4,250MW of new capacity joined the system, but twice that amount, 
around 8,500MW, exited it.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
The impending drop in capacity has triggered the search for a resolution. Without energy, the 
economy cannot sustain industry and services, and ultimately demand. For example, Helm 
(2004) argues that GB’s electricity industry has reliably maintained the UK’s economic 
stability since the 1970s, and the industry provides funds (tax revenues) to help maintain 
public spending. Thus, the importance of attracting investment to support this industry cannot 
be underestimated. 
 
3. Method 
The changing nature of investment decisions presented here is structured by time period. 
These periods mark key legislative changes that resulted in major market structure changes in 
the generation sector – such key events are useful to guide a historical research approach (Ó 
hÓgartaigh and Ó hÓgartaigh, 2004). Legislative changes since 19477, which brought about 
                                                            
5 For example, 2003 in London and Birmingham (OFGEM, 2005) 
6 The 1970s saw blackouts caused by industrial disputes that led to coal shortages.  The government in 1973 
imposed a restriction on power usage – non essential organisations were restricted to 3 days usage per week. 
(Generator Power, 2013) 
7 The research examined impact from nationalisation in 1947 but it was not until 1957 that there was a change in 
the legal framework that started to create change in investment within the industry.  The change in 1957 took a 
few years to expose change within the industry and therefore a round half a century analysis was finally decided 
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nationalisation of the industry, and significant Acts creating structural changes to the industry 
are used to explore how institutional forces may have influenced investment practices. The 
time divisions are shown in Table 1. Additionally, the historical approach of this study is 
supported by the fact that the process of financialisation occurs over a long period of time 
(Palley, 2013) and to understand its impact, requires a significant time period for analysis 
(March and Purcell, 2014). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
As were parsed our analysis into timeframes as per Table 1, it was quite apparent that 
legislation and regulation were major forces affecting the generation sector. Thus, we 
recognised the importance of the regulative pillar as per Scott (2014) from the outset. We 
then set about collecting data from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
included fourteen interviews with industry experts, as per Appendix I. All interviews were 
semi-structured and fully transcribed. As can be seen in Appendix I, most interviewees had 
excess of twenty years’ experience in the sector, the average being 28 years. The interview 
data utilised here is in effect an oral history8and interviews were conducted in a flexible 
fashion with highly knowledgeable persons (Collins and Bloom, 1991). As noted in Section 
2.2, we exclude the cultural-cognitive pillar of Scott’s (2014) work, as given the more 
historic focus and extended timeframe of this paper, it is not possible to interpret the mindset 
of decision-makers over a 50-year period. Thus, any interviews conducted for this study did 
not elicit cognitive motivations as to how and why decisions were made. Also, interviews did 
not explore how decisions were informed by an intrinsic interpretation of the cultural context 
at any time during our 50-year timeframe of analysis. Rather, the interviews provided 
clarification and insights on regulative and normative forces identified within the secondary 
sources.  
The secondary sources used include legislative acts (see Table 1), energy sector white papers, 
regulatory reports and government reports. These secondary sources were selected based on 
the period of the analysis, and on their relevance to the present study. For example, data and 
reports from the Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES) were used provide an 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
as the period of examination 1960-2010. 
8 Example of oral history studies in the accounting realm include Ikin et al. (2012), Emery et al. (2002). See also 
Tyson (1996). 
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overview of energy usage and generation during the timeframe of our research. These sources 
provided insights into how the industry responded to the regulatory influences and thus we 
hoped to find evidence (or not) of institutional change and of normative pressures - 
particularly from professionals like accountants. 
As mentioned earlier, we adopt a neo-institutionalist history approach - which specifically 
here draws on strands of Scott’s (2014) work to illuminate telling of historic events. Such an 
approach is not uncommon in accounting history literature, as the nature of historical research 
often means the views of actors cannot be obtained for reasons of mortality. Thus, well 
developed theoretical frameworks are often utilised by researchers in a broad or partial sense. 
To give an example relevant to this paper, Moreno and Cámara (2014) draw on institutional 
sociology in a broad manner to explain how changes in the content of a Chairman’s Letter to 
shareholders overtime were affected by external factors such as the political environment. 
Using elements of theoretical approaches is not uncommon in contemporary literature also. 
For example, many papers draw on elements of Actor-Network theory to explain change (see 
for example Jollands and Quinn, 2017; Jones and Dugdale, 2002; Briers and Chua, 2001).  
 
4. History of investment practices in the British electricity industry 
Constant re-investment in new assets is essential to GB’s generation market as old assets at 
end of useful life need to be replaced and there is an increasing demand for electricity see 
Figure 5.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
To meet such increases in demand, heavy investment is required over time, often with new 
financial backing. Investment patterns have changed in response to changes in fuel sources 
over the period depicted in Figure 5. As Figure 6 reveals, investments between 1960 and 
2010 varied by fuel type, with gas being the most popular fuel in recent times. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
We now provide detail on each era as set out in Table 1, exploring the key influencers on 
investment practices during each period and exploring the gradual process of financialisation.  
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4.1 Nationalisation of the energy industry, 1947  
The process of financialisation and the subsequent focus of accounting on costs and financial 
outcomes developed over a long period, and started in its strict sense after the Second World 
War (Crotty, 2005). The dominant paradigm in the decades after 1945 was Keynesian 
economics, which emphasised regulated market demand to pursue broader economic goals 
such as high employment and fast growth (Crotty, 2005). GB’s power generation industry 
was no exception to this paradigm - it was nationalised and highly regulated in the decades 
after 1945, and financial motives in investment decisions very low.  
Although nationalisation does not form part of our analysis, a brief reflection is useful. The 
Nationalisation Act(s) 1947 provided the government with authority to purchase privately 
owned assets and expropriate local government-owned assets (Patterson, 1999). The industry 
had been in crisis due to a chronic post-war plant shortage and power cuts were frequent 
(Cochrane and Schaefer, 1990). Thus, Government policy was to commission small (i.e. 30-
60 Megawatts (MW9)) plants (Cochrane and Schaefer, 1990) to provide more balance to the 
market, and the industry was controlled10 by the Central Electricity Authority11.  Stability was 
achieved by the mid-1950s, however, the management and accountability of investments was 
lacking (Simmonds, 2002), therefore, the Electricity Act was passed in 1957.  
 
4.2 The Electricity Act 1957 and developments until 1989 
The Electricity Act 1957 provided a basis to change the management of the industry. The 
Central Electricity Authority was replaced by the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB), twelve area boards, and the Electricity Council (EC) (SWEHS, 2014). The newly 
formed CEGB was responsible for generation, the area boards for supply, and the Electricity 
Council for policy-making. The CEGB was a vertically integrated monopoly, meaning it 
operated generation and transmission for the twelve area boards (Newberry and Pollitt, 
1997).12 Executive managers were responsible for daily operations and non-executives for 
                                                            
9 Megawatt is a measurement of power – 1MW represents 1,000,000 watts. 
10 The word controlled has been deliberately used instead of regulated because at this time state regulation was 
not required necessary because there was no competition or other policies that needed regulating. 
11 Prior to nationalisation, electricity had been supplied and distributed by 505 organisations (RWE, 2014). 
Nationalisation prohibited competition, as a competitive market was deemed too negative and associated with 
the mass unemployment of the 1930s (Helm, 2004).  
12 This paper will not include the development of the Scottish energy sector until the 1990s when the two 
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satisfying societal needs (Cochrane and Schaefer, 1990). Despite these changes, the 
government found it increasingly difficult to manage the industry as management control was 
spread between departments. To promote operations and financial efficiency (including 
investment), the government decided to appoint a chairman of the CEGB at the time of the 
1957 Act. The government wanted someone who would share the same ideology (Cochrane 
and Schaefer, 1990) and so appointed Christopher Hinton13 (SWEHS, 2014).  
 
The new framework provided greater stability, but not without problems. A particular 
concern was non–executives being appointed with their own political agenda (Helm, 2004); 
therefore, at this stage financial gain was not a priority. As a result of changes after the 1957 
Act, the industry was working with political and organisational input, and without regulation. 
Although large investments were made throughout the 1960s and 1970s (see Figure 6), 
politicians and economists queried whether they were the right type. Coal-fired plants were 
the focus of investment, as the coal industry was protected and politicians wanted to maintain 
employment - creating mutual efficiencies for both industries (Chick, 1987). Therefore, the 
economic growth of the country was prioritised and the role of accounting was minimal: 
economists, engineers and politicians were the main decision makers of the investment 
process.  
 
This lack of financialisation was at odds with the rest of the economy in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the Keynesian paradigm of strong social regulation started to erode (Crotty, 2005). Oil 
price shocks, the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system, falling profits and a failed 
stock market led to a counter-movement to government regulation. This change in the 
economic environment led to a stronger focus on costs, efficiency, and shareholders, paving 
the way for a stronger impact of financialisation on investment decisions in organisations, 
and ringing in an age of neoliberal globalisation (Crotty, 2005). As detailed later, the grip of 
the British government lessened, and financial measures partially, if not fully, driven by 
accountants were at the heart of investment decisions. However, the industries that were 
nationalised, such as the electricity industry, were protected from this movement and the 
phenomenon of financialisation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
systems became more entwined. 
13 A Nuclear engineer 
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Although the full impact of financialisation was not influencing investment decisions in the 
generation industry, there were control concerns and the unclear roles and objectives of the 
CEGB. These concerns resulted in regulations being introduced for the first time. In 1961, a 
white paper publicly announced that nationalised industries must aim to break even (HMT, 
1961) - a strong example for the introduction of accounting measures in investment decision-
making, and a normative force at that. The Government hoped that this would ensure careful 
consideration of future financial investments. In the early 1960s, there was also some 
recognition that a mixed fuel portfolio would be a sensible approach. The first nuclear plant 
was commissioned in 1957 (DECC, 2008), and the industry envisaged more plants being built 
during the following decade to counteract an over-reliance on coal (see Figure 6). The 
investment in nuclear power was also a political move to mitigate political instabilities such 
as the Suez Crisis in 1956 (WNA, 2014) - another example of the influences of normative 
politics rather than financial motives influencing the investment decisions. 
 
Although the industry had experienced a positive influence from politicians until this point, 
the first significant political battle of the CEGB was over nuclear power. Hinton, as Chairman 
of the CEGB, fought against nuclear investment and won. This was a shock as he had been 
chosen principally due to his background in nuclear energy generation, and his support had 
been expected (Cochrane and Schaefer, 1990). Hinton was against the cost of nuclear and 
opposed the government's pressure to build more of this technology (Taylor, 2007). Nuclear 
investment slowed and alternative fuels were considered, marking an apparent reduction in 
the strength of the government’s influence over the industry, and a significant move to the 
influence of the engineers on investment decisions. While it could be argued that this was a 
sign of accounting becoming more influential in the investment process this could be 
deceiving - Hinton wanted the money to be invested in engineering efficiency rather than 
concerns of rates of return (Taylor, 2007). 
 
Investment in new assets increased considerably in the 1960s, as did cost. In 1967, a White 
Paper on Nationalised Industries determined policy was needed on pricing and costing of 
energy investments. However, decisions made by the CEGB were not affected in spite of 
policy suggestions to increase control on investment. Information was not shared between 
government departments, resulting in suboptimal decision-making, and this affected long-
term investment decisions (Chick, 1987). Accounting still had limited influence on the 
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process. Any investments in coal, oil and nuclear continued with the aim of satisfying GB’s 
electricity needs (see Figure 6). All investments used rates of returns (RoR) provided by the 
government for investment calculations. With the RoR being low, the engineers developed 
investments that were engineering-focused rather than financially competitive – and, there 
was no competition. 
In this period, UK economic policy was influenced significantly by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (Warren and Burns, forthcoming). Thus, while policies were in place to 
encourage investments that were accountable on cost, there were stronger institutional factors 
at play. The government’s main priority was to sustain a post-war economic boom, aided by 
sustaining demand and supply in the energy sector - this continued into the 1970s. In 
historical terms, government performance was measured by the cost of living and 
unemployment levels (Chick, 1987), and large investments directly related to both. So still, 
economists played a more significant role than accountants, and the industry continued to be 
protected from the full force of financialisation.   
 
Helm (2004) argues that political agendas of the time affected decision-making on 
investments, often resulting in decisions being driven by the timing of general elections rather 
than accounting-based measures. The CEGB was happy for this to continue, as financing to 
build new plants remained forthcoming. Despite the many criticisms of this era, it provided a 
foundation for long-term decision making by executive managers. Although decision-making 
was influenced by political objectives rather than key performance indicators, investment was 
vast, and future planning within the industry embodied a positive outlook. As can be seen in 
Figure 5, demand was increasing steadily, and the CEGB responded by building more power 
plants, as seen in Figure 6. Investment decisions taken were driven mainly by engineers and 
new technology, not accountants or accounting. Thus, larger plants became a typical 
investment type during this era (Interviewee 3 and DECC, 2008). 
 
The 1970s witnessed a government shake-up, triggering a miners’ strike and in turn a coal 
supply problem (Cochrane and Schaefer, 1990). Conflict was also emerging between 
politicians and industry managers (Chick, 1987). A question arose on how investment 
decisions should be made, in particular whether investment decisions should be made by 
government, economists or engineers – with accountants playing a minimal role in this 
dialogue. Generally, the public and government were unhappy with the increase in public-
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sector borrowing to the nationalised industries - the electricity sector was largely held 
responsible for increased public funding (Chick, 2007). At the same time, there was a 
significant paradigm shift amongst political circles, as power was transferred from the 
Department of Trade and Industry to the Treasury (Warren and Burns, forthcoming). 
Although a public debate had started on the cost of the CEGB and its investments, plant 
engineers noticed no changes their daily roles. Interviewee 3 (Head of Coal Operations) 
stated: 
Money was not the focus, the industry made very little money, it was a monopoly. We 
were not performance driven, we were not performance managed – we had no KPIs 
on efficiency. Neither revenues nor capital was an issue at this point. 
 
However, due to anxiety on public spending and the reliance on particular types of fuels, the 
government established a Department of Energy (DoE) in 1974. Its primary aim was to 
ensure new energy policies included diversity to minimise the problems caused by events 
such as miner strikes (Helm, 2004). There were concerns that too much capacity was being 
fuelled by coal and oil (see Figure 6), and nuclear power became increasingly the centre of 
attention: 
Nuclear power was big business in the 70s and I worked both on the basics and on the 
experimental work in this field. It was a good time to work in the industry because 
you could push the boundaries without been run by the budgets - of course the 
budgets were there but not like today. (Interviewee 5, Environmental Planning 
Manager).  
 
After the freedom of investment in the 1970s and early 1980s, the government imposed 
spending controls on the industry, and finally accountability of the industry emerged. 
Following public concern, and increasing pressure from the Treasury, the parliament passed 
The Competition Act, placing the energy industry under the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC), ending the statutory monopoly (Helm, 2004). This created tension 
between the culture embedded in the nationalised industry and fundamentals of 
financialisation, which was influencing the rest of the economy. An investigation by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission on the CEGB was published in 1981. The 
investigation focused on the financial operations of the CEGB and its accounting processes. 
A main finding of the MMC (1981) report related to investment practices. The report 
suggested the decision-making process was not transparent and seriously flawed due to 
inaccurate accounting information and unrealistic forecasting. The MMC (1981) report noted 
that new investment had been rushed through when supply far exceeded demand - even 
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taking into account security of supply and increasing costs to consumers. It stated:  
Demand forecasting by the board and the electricity supply industry as a whole 
has been seriously inaccurate and has led to premature orders for new plant, which 
has increased costs. (MMC, 1981: 285) 
 
Despite the concerns of the MMC, the influence of accountants and appropriate use of 
accounting processes continued to be problematic due to lack of competition. 
  
Although there were many changes in and discussions about industry cost reductions on a 
social and political level, these were not transferred to the power generators. As Interviewee 1 
(Head of Operations) stated:  
There were lots of people counting things but it was not efficient, because you had the 
public money to spend. But we did have checkers checking checkers! 
 
Interviewee 6 (Business Services Director) agreed and added: 
We had an ethos of technical excellence and we still had significant budgets. 
 
Interviewee 7 (General Manager, Operations), who in the 1980s was employed in an industry 
that worked with the CEGB, confirmed the above statement: 
The CEGB was like an experiment on engineering excellence and it happened to have 
this product called electricity, which people found useful….it certainly was not there 
as a business, it was run for the public good. 
 
The conservative government became increasingly concerned with the lack of accountability 
in the nationalised industries. The Energy Act 1983 removed the monopoly structure and the 
obligation of the Electricity Board to supply, generate or distribute electricity. Government 
energy policy changed from investment to “sweating the assets14” to reduce costs, which 
started to develop new ways of providing returns on the current assets, opening the door for 
the ideology of financialisation. As Figure 5 earlier illustrates, the 1980s saw the lowest level 
of new capacity to the market for a 30-year period. Although the 1983 Act was forward-
thinking, Helm (2004) criticised its lack of detail and considerations essential for successful 
implementation. Basic accounting principles, such as the cost of capital, were relevant, but as 
there were still no competing organisations, such measures did not enter investment decision-
making. The Act was intended to open up competition, but the CEGB continued to have a 
                                                            
14 Sweating the assets is a term used to describe a plan to run existing power stations for as long as possible, 
without concern for long-term supply. 
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monopoly. Investment was low risk for the CEGB, which could continue to rely on end-users 
paying. Meanwhile, new entrants only had access to short-term contracts (Helm, 2004), 
thereby increasing their risk. They also had to borrow at much higher rates, making the RoR 
to the CEGB incomparable to private companies. Thus, while new entrants were subject to 
the fundamentals surrounding financialisation, the CEGB was still protected, making it 
impossible to compete. Consequently, encouraging competition to the industry failed. This 
resulted in the government changing its position, moving further towards privatisation. The 
ethos of nationalisation had arguably failed, and pro-privatisation groups argued that 
privatisation would improve efficiency (Chick, 2007). 
 
By the end of the 1980s, the government was determined not only to privatise the industry, 
but restructure it (Patterson, 1999). As noted by Littlechild (2000), some principles laid the 
foundations of these new plans. These included relinquishing management of the industry to 
managers within, providing an opportunity for customers to take a bigger role in the industry, 
i.e. offer more choice, increasing efficiency by targeting investment in new power stations, 
providing good investment opportunities to the public, increasing revenue for the 
government; and imposing the RPI-X formula15 as had been done in the gas and 
telecommunications industries. The privatisation plan was fully unveiled in a government 
White Paper in 1988, titled “Privatising Electricity”. The paper was followed by the 
Electricity Act in 1989 (HMSO, 1989), which marked the privatisation of assets valued at £32 
billion (Chick, 2007).  
 
4.3 The 1990s 
Following the 1989 Act, the 1990s were a period of regulation-driven restructuring 
(Newberry and Pollitt, 1997). For the successful privatisation of an industry, ownership and 
regulation were required. As with other utilities being privatised around the same time, this 
provided new sources of ownership, investment strategies and operations (March and Purcell, 
2014). The privatisation process resulted in the CEGB being split into four separate 
companies, three of which were floated on the stock market (RWE, 2014), inviting 
shareholders into the fold. The ownership structure post-privatisation was as follows (RWE, 
2014): 
                                                            
15 This refers to a regulatory price-cap mechanism. 
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● National Power and Powergen (founded 1990) - owned the generators; 
● National Grid Company (founded 1990) - owned the network and regional electricity 
companies acting as suppliers; 
● Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro- Electric (founded 1991). 
 
Nuclear plants remained under public ownership initially. In 1996, however, the more 
modern nuclear plants were floated as British Energy, with only the old Magnox16 plants 
remaining in public ownership (Newberry and Pollitt, 1997) within the Nuclear Electric 
entity. Immediately following privatisation (1991), 95% of the generating industry was 
owned by National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric; the remaining 5% were owned by 
interconnectors17 from Scotland and France (Littlechild, 2000). A separate company, the 
National Grid Company (NGC)18, operated transmission services. Thus, at the outset, the 
capital invested in the industry was still UK capital. However, change in ownership brought 
new financial investors on board.  Many of the new owners were foreign, starting the 
globalization of the GB’s energy industry and the impacts of financialisation, liberalization 
and globalization. 
 
Privatisation brought about a change in values and attitudes, reflected in higher prices, and 
accounting became more important as each generator was answerable to shareholders. The 
values of financialisation were being adopted by the industry, as privatisation had opened the 
door to a change in ideology.  Interviewee 7 (General Manager of Operations) recalled: 
People suddenly became alive because they had new opportunities, to do things they 
could never do before, as they were constrained by the sort of very rigid structures 
that you often see in state run industries. 
 
Interviewee 1 (Head of Gas Operations) added:  
Private companies were now responsible for producing the best returns for 
shareholders and making the business profitable. 
 
Therefore, if Net Present Value (NPV) of any investment was positive, investment occurred - 
a stark contrast to the during the nationalized era. During the 1990s NPVs were positive, and 
                                                            
16 Magnox was a type of nuclear power reactor – now obsolete 
17 Interconnectors are simply electricity companies who are connected to England to supply electricity – 
generation is outside of England, 
18 Now known as National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) 
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Interviewee 3 (Head of Coal Operations) explained the efficiencies obtained: 
 
We moved away from keeping the lights on using very robust investment processes 
that were based around the client (the customer) to a system that was cost conscious 
and efficient. The efficiencies within investment included manpower, for example, an 
existing asset ‘Station A’ had 650 staff before privatisation and a few years after 
privatisation this was down to 260.  
 
Once the protected coal contract19 ended in 1993, coal was no longer the cheapest generation 
method, and throughout the remainder of the decade natural gas was preferred (DECC, 2008) 
as it provided better returns for shareholders. By the mid-to-late 1990s, the regulator 
(OFFER) were breaking down barriers to entry, and with attractive electricity prices the 
generation industry attracted new competitors and new financial investors (Robinson, 2013). 
These new competitors were known as Independent Power Producers (IPPs). As the IPPs 
entered, the big players established during privatisation started to acquire. These changes in 
ownership marked the start of a highly competitive GB electricity industry. Although new 
built investment (especially in gas) occurred, most of it was through acquisition, and this 
period was known as the “dash for gas”. The increase in gas investment was driven by the 
large margin between costs and revenue, with new entrants preferring efficient and cost 
effective assets (IEA, 2007). As Interviewee 10 (Site Manager) said: 
We went from investing in reliable and conventional power stations towards 
competitive and cutting edge technology. 
 
However, the gas stations were financed through debt. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2007) argued that investment in gas represented an ability to respond to changing 
market forces. However, the Labour government intervened, fearing the influx of gas 
investment was distorting the industry and leading to a lack of investment in coal.  There was 
tension between economic policy and the financialisation of the industry: 
They issued a moratorium, which effectively meant no more planning permission was 
given around that time period (Interviewee 4, Commercial Manager).  
 
Therefore, while privatisation supported the values of financialisation, the economy was still 
influenced by politics. The moratorium in October 1998 slowed down the rate of planned 
investments (Simmonds, 2002). Therefore, although the government had formerly 
                                                            
19 As part of the privatisation agreement, the government arranged for coal to be protected.  Both National 
Power and Powergen would purchase their coal suppliers from British Coal. The UK coal industry was then 
privatised in 1994. 
22 
championed market-led investment, there were signs of market manipulation via regulation - 
regulation tied to counter the impact of financialisation.  
 
4.4 The 2000s 
From 2000 onwards, national and international regulation had great impact. A new regulatory 
office, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) replaced OFFER through the 
Utilities Act 2000. The UK government and regulator-based policy interventions included, 1) 
the lifting of the gas moratorium (Simmonds, 2002), 2) the introduction of NETA (Warren, 
2003), and 3) the introduction of the British Electricity Transmission and Trading 
Arrangements (BETTA) (OFGEM, 2005) that included Scotland from April 2005.  
 
NETA was established to provide a transparent market to trade electricity. Trading on NETA 
was through bilateral and multilateral contracts, creating an open market. NETA was the 
additional market mechanism to control future investment; one of the most fundamental 
changes amplifying the process of financialisation.20Following its introduction in 2001, the 
English/Welsh power generation industry was viewed as one of the most competitive markets 
globally (Haney and Pollitt, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Warren, 2014; Warren, 2003). As 
competition increased, market-led investment appeared to work. However, the introduction of 
NETA led to a reduction in prices, which altered investment patterns as the price of 
wholesale electricity did not support continued investment. Accountants were putting a hold 
on new investment as there were no returns to shareholders. With excess generation capacity 
and no capacity payment in place under NETA, financially unviable plants were mothballed 
and many IPPs went bankrupt. As the Head of Thermal Generation (Interviewee 14) stated:  
 
“there was a fundamental shift in the way we made decisions, this was the first 
time we had seen good, technically efficient plants been shut down simply because 
older plants, which were detrimental to the environment were making more money.  
The traders and the accountants could see better ways to make profit and the 
production of electricity, in some cases, was not one of them”.  
 
By 2002, 40 percent of generating assets in the UK were owned by financially distressed 
                                                            
20 The Pool and Settlement system required every generator to bid on the cost of generating electricity in half 
hour periods.  The highest accepted bid set the price for all generators in that time period.  If the generator failed 
to deliver there was no financial penalty.  A capacity payment was also used under this system. 
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companies, or had been repossessed (Thomas, 2006).  
 
In the same year as NETA was introduced, the energy sector witnessed the collapse of Enron. 
Enron was a good example of a company in this sector moving from profiting by the 
distribution of natural gas and electricity to making profit from trading energy derivatives – 
this had an impact on UK energy companies. The demise of Enron not only had an effect on 
further investments in the sector but also millions of pension holders (Blackburn, 2002) who 
were reliant on the profits gained through the energy derivatives that the industry had become 
reliant on over the physical flow of resources (Loftus and March, 2015). In the period that 
followed, minimal new investment occurred (see Figure 6), and the generators sweated old 
assets, many of which were coal plants (Interview 4, Commercial Manager). The result was 
that some newer, more efficient power stations being mothballed due to associated finance, as 
noted by interviewee 14, earlier. In other words, the new power stations were closed as the 
debt attached was not payable – the return  to shareholders did not support the operational 
costs. This left old “dirty” coal plants in operation as these had no debt attached to them. As 
shareholders demanded increasing returns, the generators’ business model changed. The 
strong competition at the end of the 1990s weakened, and larger players acquired the smaller 
IPPs. Stronger vertical integration became the norm, and operating budgets were squeezed to 
manage reductions in wholesale pricing. For example, Interviewee 6 (Business Services 
Director) commented:  
We probably had between a third and a half of the resources that we used to have in 
the power stations. So we moved from engineering excellence to a focus on 
competition and efficiency.  
 
The market structure changes outlined thus far also took place in a context of additional 
environmental regulation. The environmental regulations implemented during the decade are 
outlined in Table 2. The Renewable Obligations mechanisms and Large Combustion Plant 
Directive triggered major changes to investment patterns and capacity margins. These 
regulations triggered a demand for significant investments, as observed by Interviewee 11 
(Environmental Manager): 
There was a huge increase of legislation emerging from Europe. The European policy 
developments have necessitated significant investments in the UK portfolio.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Despite the many new environmental policies and directives, the government continued to 
believe the industry could manage the market. It offered no policy guidance, despite evidence 
that EU environmental policies were making a significant impact on the type of investments 
being made. Riley (2011) argues the regulatory impact started at the beginning of the century, 
with the drivers firmly being environmental concerns. As Interviewee 5 (Environmental 
Planning Manager) noted:  
The product was still fine, it’s actually the way we make it that I suppose became the 
big issue…… we just didn’t face these kind of issues when I joined in 1970.  
 
Interview 8 (Head of Environment) agreed, adding:  
When I first joined the industry, in 1976, the environment was a bit of Research and 
Development but never a big issue, it was a buried issue. Now it is one of the biggest 
strategic issues we have to face. It has changed the way we consider investments. Now 
you can’t sit on a board without being an environmental expert. 
 
Emissions were an increasing concern, and the government implemented policies to reduce 
them by offering financial incentives to build renewable capacity (Warren, 2014). The 
Renewable Obligations mechanism was introduced in 2002. It offered financial incentives, 
through the use of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs), to generate electricity from 
renewable sources like wind and solar. These certificates were intended to encourage greater 
investment in assets fuelled by renewable sources, and as Figure 5 shows, investments did 
consequently increase. If the generators exceeded their obligations, they could trade the 
excess; but if they did not meet their obligations, a financial penalty was payable (OFGEM, 
2014). Arguably, the environment has thus also been financialised by using economic 
mechanisms to control emissions (Loftus and March, 2015). 
 
As investments in renewable assets continued and investment in other assets decreased, 
questions arose about the ability of a market-led industry to ensure security of supply. The 
risk to security of supply arose from the combination of concerns about a restricted gas 
supply and unexpected outages due to technical problems (Interviewee 12, Trader). Despite 
the capacity concerns, government focus remained on environmental regulations and targets. 
In 2006, a white paper titled “The Energy Challenge” focused on two main concepts, energy 
security and emission reduction. The government had to create a framework to offer more 
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certainty to motivate investment. This framework focused on improving investment by 
opening up private investment in nuclear power. This demonstrated that the government still 
believed the market could establish security of supply through further deregulation.  
 
When the 2006 White Paper was published, the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) 
and carbon emission reduction targets became the focus of investment, regulation and 
sustainability discussions. Environmental directives from the EU increased: 
The directives required the Governments of the member states to introduce laws, 
regulations or whatever means to adhere to the minimum requirements, Europe is the 
driving force…. actually deciding if something needs doing for the common good. 
(Interviewee 5, Environmental Planning Manager). 
 
The LCPD resulted in a commitment to close six of the 16 coal plants by 2015 and three oil-
fired plants (Michaels and Williams, 2012). This equated to 12,338MW of capacity exiting 
the system, as the generators did not invest to reduce emissions. It was apparent by the end of 
2006 that the industry had limited interest in new investment, whether gas, coal, integrated 
gas plants or renewables (IEA, 2007). Investment was declining (see Figure 6), due to a 
combination of pricing21, lack of government policy (Interviewee 1 – Head of Gas 
Operations), and increased regulation.  
 
During the 2000s, the number of EU environmental regulations vastly increased (see Table 
2). As Interviewee 2 stated:  
You have to blame the EU for the second black industrial revolution…. the system 
just got bigger without considering the fluidity of the past and that gives a kind of 
arthritis in the control system which is not very helpful.  
 
The UK government agreed to implement the EU directives without considering implications 
for future supply. Towards the end of the 2000s, it was clear to everyone (organisations, 
regulators and the government) that increased environmental regulations were provoking a 
crisis, despite denials by OFGEM and the government. The environmental regulators 
working with engineers could foresee the threat, as Interviewee 2 noted: 
The main issues revolve around investment and how power will be supplied to the 
country ongoing past these milestones (the deadline for directives such as the LCPD) 
Many power stations will close to take the easier timing option, and that is a good 
                                                            
21 Although electricity prices were starting to increase the price of gas was also. 
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commercial decision - whether it is a good decision for the national power supply 
perspective remains to be seen.  
Interestingly, the generators argued that two key issues restricted investment, namely capital 
constraints and environmental regulations (Interview 3, Head of Coal Operations). 
Investment was stalled, despite fears that security of supply would become a problem. 
Engineers were predicting that the government would need to change the structure of the 
system, to support new investment through mechanisms such as capacity payment regulations 
(Interview 3, Head of Coal Operations). 
The introduction of new market mechanisms to encourage new investment as well as 
incentive based payments for technology that is environmentally sustainable complicated the 
decision making process further, as it had not solved the problem. While there were small 
investments made they were not significant enough to resolve the crisis, as the Head of 
Corporate Regulations (interviewee 13) stated: 
At the moment we are trying to model why some technologies are more successful 
than other in our responses to the EMR, also why the smaller generators are able to 
submit lower prices.  We have found there are many hidden subsidies in 
distribution plants and we are lobbying to eradicate those.  Smaller companies are 
generally debt financed and this creates a cheaper cost of capital than the bigger 
players with equity. Large companies have a bigger market rent to our tipping point 
of investing in new plant and it is harder to meet. 
  
It was now suggested that privatisation and the ideology of financialisation placed energy 
generation on a path toward crisis (Robinson, 2013). By 2010, the industry was facing a 
problematic future because of lack of investment due to energy policies not supported by 
incentives to change, early closure of coal plants and the decommissioning of nuclear plants 
at the end of their useful life (Warren, 2014).  
5. Discussion and concluding comments 
As noted in the introduction, current debate in the GB energy industry centres on pricing and 
the investment hiatus (DECC, 2011). While electricity prices have increased, investment has 
slowed (see Figures 3 and 5). The solution offered is the EMR which will deliver an 
estimated £95 billion of investment to keep the lights on in the short term (DECC, 2014a). As 
noted in the introduction, this paper seeks to understand how the financialisation of 
investment practices has played an increasingly dominant part in this potential energy crisis 
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in the UK. The Big Six have responded to the normative pressures from the market as any 
privatised company would, by seeking to protect profits and seek low-risk investments on 
real assets. However, influence from the government and regulators (regulative pressures) are 
an important part of the picture when seeking to understand the current potential crisis in the 
UK, as they as a regulative opposite to the normative responses of institutional actors in more 
recent years. With the market privatised and the regulators introducing market devices to 
control emissions, the generators have responded by maximising shareholder value through 
profits emerging from both productive capitalism and speculative capitalism, a problem that 
accountants have encouraged (Hatherly and Kretzschmar, 2011). Electricity generation is no 
longer about simply generating electricity to meet public demand, it is generating electricity 
in the most productive way to produce profit and sometimes this conflicts with the basic 
needs of the country. Due to privatisation and the dogma of financialisation, market 
mechanisms and institutional investors now exert normative pressures and control the 
decision-making of the industry, facilitated by accounting teams and processes. The 
following discussion draws on elements of Scott’s (2014) pillars of institutions, where the 
increasing influence of financialisation and accounting measures is an interplay between 
regulative and normative pressures on the organisational field. 
 
In the previous section, it was noted that during nationalisation an open-purse policy created 
intense investment periods during the 1950-70s. Although investment continued into the 
1980s, growth slowed. Large coal and oil plants were used to maintain demand and there was 
sufficient capacity. Investments in the nationalisation period were primarily subject to 
government and regulatory influence. Thus, investment practices were effectively dictated 
through legislation, with the government leading business plans for new investments. These 
practices became the accepted way of thinking and acting on investment projects within this 
period (and later periods), and we can construe them as institutionalised investment practices. 
Thus, we can apply concepts outlined by Scott (2014) to tease out how investment practices 
changed over time with the strengthening influence of financialisation, and, determine the 
increased contribution and influence of accounting in the series of events leading to the 
current energy crisis. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 summarises the regulative and normative pillars, underpinning investment practices 
up to 1990. In effect, the government used the industry to win votes, relying on investment to 
reduce costs and protect employment figures. Legislation and the active role of the 
government were the main regulatory instruments used. Accountants were part of the process, 
but their influence was minimal to negligible, as the nationalisation of the industry buffered 
any impact they may have had. At the same time, it also warded off financialisation 
processes. Meanwhile, the CEGB had free reign to invest heavily in research and new plants, 
and used this opportunity to drive forward a strategy of engineering excellence - a normative 
influence driven by the engineering profession. Thus, prior to privatisation, there was a 
dominant logic of engineering, where normative institutional forces framed the strategy of 
energy generators. Engineering excellence determined the objectives of generators (Carter 
and Mueller, 2006), which was to maintain the distribution network, and place emphasis on 
research and development to further the technological advances (see also Table 3). Since this 
was in line with regulative investment plans and Acts passed by the government, there were 
no significant contradictions in the system (all parties followed an investment path) and 
security of supply was by and large safe. In other words, during nationalisation, the 
institutional forces acting on the organisational field were in compliance, and there was an 
easy truce (Government vs. CEGB) as both shared the understanding that everyone should be 
able to receive and afford electricity. The process of financialisation was constrained by the 
fact that the product, electricity, was seen as a basic need, and its distribution over 
technologically advanced networks driven by engineers (Carter and Mueller, 2006). With no 
effective competition, the taxpayer was funding investments resulting in a low cost of capital, 
there was no concern for shareholder value, and thus the industry could invest without 
demands for high returns. As Scott (2014) argues, institutions provide direction and 
expression to actions (decisions) and this provides the interest and motivation which 
constitute the institution. The process of satisfying the demand for electricity was the 
institutionalised direction and expression of the decision-making process until the 1980s. 
With the Thatcher-government ushering in an age of divesting assets to encourage market 
entry and competition (Carter and Mueller, 2006), the successful privatisation in the telecom 
industry triggered similar processes in other industries, such as railways and utilities. The 
government introduced various Acts from 1989 to lessen the burden on the state, and increase 
profitability in formerly nationalised sectors. For the UK electricity-generating industry, this 
implied a change from the formerly dominant logic of engineering to a now rising dominance 
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of the logic of financialisation (or what Carter and Mueller, 2006 term as a dominant logic of 
accountingisation). Privatisation created unease between the government and the CEGB, and 
thus the factors influencing investment practices changed (see Table 4). It created tensions 
between regulative and normative pressures, and altered both the competitive landscape and 
the preference for more profitable technology/fuel types. Lacking the scrutiny of investment 
plans by regulators or the government, the increasing focus on profitability triggered a dash-
for-gas era during the 1990s, and ended investment in coal and oil. Gas was preferred as it 
offered better returns on investment. Any new investments now had to respond to the needs 
of the financial markets, requiring added shareholder value, and the process of 
financialisation was making a tangible impact on the decision-making process. Whilst the 
logics underpinning that process were at a transitional stage, as the engineering culture still 
existed, the accountant and accounting processes became more dominant (underpinned by 
financialisation). Dixon and Scott (2014) argue that the political economy provides varying 
sets of options, however, some options outweigh others, and in the 1990s the financial 
parameters of decision-making were outweighing the engineering values (similar Carter and 
Mueller, 2006). 
The step back from government-led investments created a market that was simple at the 
outset. However, Table 4 shows that regulatory influence increased again during the 1990s, 
opening up competition and protecting consumers. Normative influences changed too, as 
shareholders materialised, and their demands for high returns on investments became the 
focus of investment plans - leading to a preference for cheaper fuel, gas, as noted. As the 
generators prioritised profit in a climate of price regulation, the strategy of sweating old 
assets continued. New investment was now financed through debt, and the financial services 
sector were now stakeholders. Thus, during the 1990s, investment practices were subjected to 
normative influences to a greater degree from accounting than previously. Investment 
techniques such as NPV, cost of capital and cost efficiencies came to the fore. This is not to 
say such techniques were not used prior to the 1990s, but as noted previously, profitability 
was not the driver of decisions.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Around the year 2000, regulators acknowledged that market structures formed during 
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privatisation had failed. At the same time, NETA and financialisation of the market became 
more significant. However, the concept of trusting the market to send signals to instigate new 
investment was problematic, as now with accounting as a normative force, only profitable 
investments were likely to get accepted. Old capacity started to reach the end of its useful 
life, and government and regulator-led investment incentives were biased towards 
renewables, thus – at least partially - reintroducing objectives that were beneficial on a 
societal level (see Table 5). This left non-renewables to the established normative pressures 
as before, and it was not seen favourably to have a market in which the government 
periodically meddles with selected investments. Interviewee 9 (Head of Gas Generation) 
summarised the situation in noting that “the government is in and out of the water all the time 
and it muddies your investment decisions”. This pattern of regulative interventions created 
such uncertainty that it threatened all future investment by generators. The normative 
influence of accounting during the 1990s resulted in poor investments from a societal point of 
view (but beneficial from a profitability viewpoint), and there were no consistent regulatory 
forces to counteract these new (and by now) institutionalised post-privatisation investment 
practices, as depicted in Table 5. Limits on investment were compounded by EU 
environmental regulations affecting non-renewables - for example, investments considering 
the LCPD in 2006 using accounting measures would suggest they were not financially 
attractive. In spite of the government introducing environmental regulations that required 
compliance by generators to benefit from financial incentives, it did little to discourage the 
Big Six continued to engage in accounting-driven behaviour. Investment in renewables were 
undertaken not with the objective to fulfil societal needs as pre-privatisation, but rather to 
benefit from available financial incentives. Profit was now gained through the production of 
electricity and trading financial derivatives. It was common for generators to choose to stop 
producing electricity and to sell gas they had bought through hedged contracts22. Traders and 
accountants were still governing the decision to generate or not (Warren, 2003; Head of 
Thermal Generation UK, Interviewee 14). There were no adequate regulative institutional 
forces at play to counteract this accounting-driven view of investment or generation, as 
government policies did little to achieve compliance by accounting-driven norms to ensure 
basic economic and societal needs. The process of financialisation had introduced a persistent 
element of strategizing to the benefit of shareholders and shareholder value – fulfilling the 
                                                            
22 This happened when the profit differential between the hedged gas price and the current price was higher than 
the profit that could be made through generating electricity. 
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energy demand of the public was no longer the priority of the investors who owned the 
physical assets. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Bringing together Tables 3, 4 and 5, the interplay between and effect of regulative and 
normative forces on investment practices becomes evident over the time period. In light of 
our discussion, it is reasonable to suggest that (compliant) institutionalised investment 
practices are required to accomplish the overall objective to “keep the lights on”. As we 
illustrated throughout this paper, such practices include many concerns such as public 
interest, engineering and finance. Looking at the ‘Affect’ row of Tables 3 to 5 reveals a 
changing set of investment practices over time, and after privatisation in the 1990s, the 
influence of accounting became the dominant logic (Carter and Mueller, 2006). Concerns 
such as return on investment, profits, risk, which were all underpinned through the 
phenomenon of financialisation, turned out to be more influential in creating these 
institutionalised practices, which were spread through normative forces throughout the sector. 
Although normative and regulative forces still support these institutionalised investment 
practices more recently (see Table 5), the societal key priority of the sector, adequate and 
appropriate regulations to “keep the lights on”, has been absent as accounting dominated 
investment practices, and the logic of financialisation persists. To secure adequate investment 
that is able to meet demand adequately, a regulative force is needed to ensure investment - 
rules, laws, systems, monitoring, and sanctions – and override accounting views.  
Thus, to sum up, the historical view provided in this paper provides evidence of an increasing 
importance and influence of financialisation in investment decisions on power generation in 
GB. A focus on accounting concepts and creating profit through speculative capitalism rather 
than productive has reduced investment on an adequate scale in recent decades. Added to 
this, when regulations such as environmental directives increased the need for investment in 
older plants, firms were unwilling to make the investment due to inadequate returns, and 
could only be lured by financial incentives. The declining investment has undoubtedly 
contributed to GB’s current energy problem, and accounting – as embodied within 
institutionalised investment practices - is arguably a contributory normative factor. The 
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historical analysis has enabled us to propose this view, as without it we would not have 
sufficient context or data to trace the changing role of accounting in investment practices in 
GB’s energy generation sector. Thus, similar to authors like Quinn (2014) and Richardson 
and Kilfoyle (2016), we suggest that historical studies over an extended timeframe do help 
interpret current issues. We would thus encourage future studies like the present one in other 
sectors where accounting in a broad sense may influence investment practices or similar. 
We should note some limitations of this study. We focus on institutional forces - and 
institutions do embody actors - but the majority of the analysis here is based on historical 
documents. These cannot by definition embody actors or their intrinsic motives. We have, 
however, supplemented our work with comments from interviewees (see Appendix 1), which 
provides support for our analysis. A second limitation is the interviewees themselves, in that 
they may not recall events from thirty or more years ago with complete accuracy. We also did 
not investigate relevant cultural settings that may or may not have influenced cognitive 
interpretations of the external environment by decision-makers. However, interviewees did 
express similar and consistent comments, which were supported by the historical document 
analysis. Third, we do not explicitly explore detailed accounting and/or investment practices 
at a micro-level here, and future studies in this context may be useful. Finally, it could be 
argued that the study of GB alone is a limitation. It is highly likely that all investments in 
power generation regardless of location encompass accounting practice of some form. Thus, 
comparable studies of accounting practices over time at a detailed level, while interesting 
from an accounting history perspective, may be augmented with studies which explore the 
broader and relative role of accounting in investment decisions. 
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Appendix 1 – Interviewee information  
Role Interviewee 
# 
Years of 
service  
(as of 2014) 
Head of Operations 1 31  
Environmental Permitting Regulator 2 21  
Head of Coal Operations 3 38  
Commercial Manager 4 16 
Environmental Planning Manager 5 44 
Business Service Director 6 25 
General Manager Operations 7 23 
Head of Environment 8 38 
Head of Gas Generation 9 27 
Site Manager 10 34 
Environmental Manager 11 27 
Trader 12 15 
Head of Corporate Regulation 13 20 
Head of Thermal Power, UK 14 30 
 
 
